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DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE 
FORM OF TAX LEGISLATION 
BY MONICA BABULA 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 25, 1957, the European Economic Community Treaty was founded to create 
economic unity in order to prevent more turmoil between the European nations.1  The European 
Economic Community evolved into the European Union (the EU) in 1993, adding foreign policy 
coordination and internal security.2  Throughout the years, the EU has grown to encompass now 
twenty-eight Member States.3  Each State retains sovereignty, but must also abide by the current 
Treaty, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the TFEU).4  Although the Treaty 
encompasses many provisions, there is much that is not stated within it.  Thus, European Union 
case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union (formerly the European Court of Justice) 
is used to fill in the blanks.  
The following case analysis, examines discriminatory treatment of migrant workers in the 
European Union and the prohibitions and allowances under the fundamental freedoms, specifically 
the free movement of workers.  Its purpose is to distinguish between prohibited and allowable 
discriminatory treatment of workers, including overt and covert discrimination, but more 
specifically discrimination of migrant workers in the tax context.  To be precise, the term migrant 
worker as applied in this analysis refers to citizens of one of the twenty-eight Member States whom 
                                                 
1 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, Art. 2, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EECT].  
See ROGER GOEBEL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 3 (2015). 
2 ROGER GOEBEL ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 3 (2015). 
3 Id. at 17-19.  
4 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2010 O.J. C 83/47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
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have chosen to work and/or move to another Member State for economic reasons.  Additionally, 
the cases used in the analysis are based on an individual’s freedom of movement, rather than that 
of a company’s right of establishment. 5 
The analysis of existing case law will elaborate on the Schumacker principle, which takes 
into account whether a Member State considers an individual’s personal and family circumstances 
into the calculation of taxes, and whether under such considerations a migrant worker is 
discriminated against or whether there is simply an allowable discrepancy in tax legislation 
amongst Member States.6  The subsequent sections will elaborate on the cases leading up to 
Schumacker, address Schumacker, and then show the most recent case law applying the common 
understanding by the Court of Justice of the European Union (the CJEU) when deciding issues 
involving tax discrimination of migrant workers.7  The recent case law will show the Court of 
Justice moving farther away from harmonization of tax measures.  
II. ARTICLE 45 OF THE TFEU 
The prominent provision of Art 45 of the TFEU states that freedom of the movement of 
workers “shall entail the abolition of discrimination based on nationality between workers of the 
Member States” in regards to work and employment.8  Before further analysis begins on the 
discrimination that migrant workers face within the European Union, the term worker should first 
be defined.  Such definition of the term is not provided for in the TFEU, however, case law 
establishes an understanding on what the term should mean. 
                                                 
5 TFEU, supra note 4, art. 45, 2010 O.J. C 83/47, at 66. 
6 Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Koln-Alstadt v. R. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225 (arguing that personal and family 
circumstances are to be taken into account in either the employment State or residence State).  
7 The Court of Justice of the European Union was formerly known as the European Court of Justice. 
8 TFEU, supra note 4, art. 45, 2010 O.J. C 83/47, at 66. 
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The Court of Justice has defined the term “worker” broadly, to be applied using a 
Community meaning rather than one interpreted by each Member State.9   The Court further 
defined the term using “objective criteria.”10  For Art 45 of the TFEU (former EECT Art 48) to 
apply, the criterion is “the existence of an employment relationship, regardless of the legal nature 
of that relationship and its purpose.”11  The objective criteria are to “distinguish the employment 
relationship by reference to the rights and duties of the persons concerned.”12  The essential factors 
used to distinguish an employment relationship are that “for a certain period of time a person 
performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives 
remuneration.”13 
The case of Lawrie-Blum specifically dealt with a British national who applied to a teacher-
training program in Germany in order to become a German high school teacher.14  However, she 
was denied admission into the program because German law required applicants to be of German 
nationality for such a position.15  The Court determined that the applicant was considered a worker 
since she fulfilled the three essential factors.16  
Thus, under such a broad approach, a student internship falls under the definition of a 
worker.  In determining whether or not an individual may be categorized as a worker, neither the 
scope of employment nor the nature of the “legal relationship” between an employer and employee 
are relevant.17  In the context of Lawrie-Blum, educational services are not barred by TFEU Art 45  
                                                 
9  Case C-66/85, Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1986 E.C.R. I-2121, ¶ 14 (holding that a trainee teacher 
is a worker because for a certain period of time she performed services for and under the directions of another person 
in return for which she received remuneration).  
10 Id. ¶ 14. 
11 Id. ¶ 15.   
12 Id. ¶ 17. 
13 Id. ¶ 17. 
14 Case C-66/85, Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1986 E.C.R. I-2121, ¶ 2. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. ¶ 18. 
17 Id. ¶ 4.  
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(former EECT Art 48) just because they might not be inherently economic in nature.18  This 
definition is to be applied under all employment circumstances fulfilling the three essential factors 
held by the Court.  Additionally, the Court determined that apprenticeships are not barred from the 
application of Art 45 (former EECT Art 48).19 
The Community meaning of the term worker further emphasizes that part-time 
employment is not to be treated any differently than full-time employment in permitting migrant 
workers residency in other Member States.20  The Court reasoned that although such part-time 
employment may not be enough to fulfill subsistence, it “constitutes for a large number of persons 
an effective means of improving their conditions.”21  Therefore, it follows that part-time workers 
who receive compensation below that of standard wages, are still to be considered a worker.22  The 
Court, however, also makes clear that only “effective and genuine” activities and not pursuit of 
“marginal or ancillary” activities are covered by part-time employment.23  Finally, the Court also 
makes clear that an individual’s motive for pursuing employment is not to be considered.24 
The Court of Justice has further determined that employers, not just workers, have standing 
to bring claims under Art 45 TFEU (former EECT Art 48).25  Not only is overt discrimination 
based on nationality prohibited, but so too are covert forms of discrimination.26  Such an example 
involves requiring an individual who is a national of another Member State to reside in a particular 
Member State in order to qualify as a manager.  Such a requirement would only be appropriate if 
                                                 
18 Id. ¶ 20.  
19 Case C-66/85, Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1986 E.C.R. I-2121, ¶ 19. 
20 Case C-53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris Van Justitie, 1982 E.C.R. I-1035, ¶ 18  (holding that part-time employees 
are considered employees so long as they pursue effective and genuine activities).  
21 Id. ¶ 15.  
22 Id. ¶ 16.  
23 Id. ¶ 17.  
24 Id. ¶ 22.  
25 Case C-350/96, Clean Car Auto Service v. Landeshauptmann Von Wien, 1998 E.C.R. I-2521  (arguing that EECT 
Art 48 grants an employer standing and that a residence requirement constitutes covert discrimination).  
26 Id. ¶ 27.  
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it were used with “objective considerations independent of the nationality of the employees 
concerned and proportionate to a legitimate aim pursued by the national law.”27 
When it comes to military service, a number of the Member States compelled men to fulfill 
that duty, in the earlier years.  In Germany, the law treated such time away for military service “as 
though it were employment for purposes of seniority and pension benefits.”28  Thus, when the 
Court of Justice was tasked to determine whether such a law applied to a national of Italy working 
in Germany and serving his duty in Italy, the Court determined that such a law applies to non-
nationals just as equally as it does to nationals of Germany.29  
Although it is established that an individual is a worker, in order to be eligible to invoke 
legal protection under the TFEU a natural person must also have a Member State nationality.30 
Once this important factor is realized, then that individual may rely on the fundamental freedoms 
provided for in the TFEU.31   
Nonetheless, third-country nationals who are long-term residents also retain rights under 
the Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003.32  Specifically, third-country nationals 
who “reside[] legally in a Member State for a period of time to be determined and who hold[] a 
long-term residence permit should be granted in that Member State a set of uniform rights which 
are as near as possible to those enjoyed by citizens of the European Union.”33  Under the Directive, 
eligible individuals benefit from equal treatment, such that of Member State nationals, in regards 
                                                 
27 Id. ¶ 31.  
28 Case C-15/69, Wurttenbergische Milchverwertung v. Ugliola, 1969 E.C.R. I-363  (holding that a migrant worker 
who interrupted his employment for purposes of serving military obligations in his national State is entitled to have 
that period taken into account for calculation of his seniority).   
29 Id. ¶ 7.  
30 Hanna Litwinczuk, Taxation of Cross-Border Workers and EC Tax Law, in 6 EATLP INTERNATIONAL TAX SERIES, 
TAXATION OF WORKERS IN EUROPE 71, 73 (Joerg Manfred Moessner ed., 2008). 
31 Id. 
32 Council Directive 2003/109/EC Concerning the Status of Third-Country Nationals who are Long Term Residents, 
2004 O.J. L 16.  [hereinafter Directive on Third-Country Nationals].  See also Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 73. 
33 Directive on Third-Country Nationals, supra note 32, ¶ 2.  
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to tax benefits as well as other benefits.34  But, to be clear, this applies only to those third-country 
nationals who have a “registered or usual place of residence” within the territory of a Member 
State.35 
The case of Kamberaj provides for an interpretation on the right to equal treatment under 
the Directive on Third-Country Nationals.36  Mr. Kamberaj was an Albanian national residing and 
working in the Autonomous Province of Bolzano, where he received housing benefits.37  However, 
in 2010 when he applied to renew his benefits his application was rejected because his funds as a 
third-country national had been exhausted.38  In contrast, Italian nationals, and nationals of other 
Member States, in the same economic need would receive housing benefits under the same 
circumstances.39  Thus, the Court concluded that so long as housing benefits fell amongst one of 
the rights guaranteed under the Directive, such a provision is discriminatory.40  Accordingly, 
although the purpose of this case analysis focuses on discriminatory treatment of migrant workers 
that are citizens of the Member States, it is interesting to see the same application of law to third-
country nationals.  
III. SCOPE OF THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR WORKERS 
The scope of the free movement of workers under the TFEU generally does not apply to 
“internal situations or situations that do not involve a sufficient” level of foreign elements, as 
established by settled European Union case law.41  In essence, the fundamental freedoms do not 
                                                 
34 Directive on Third-Country Nationals, supra note 32, art. 11(1).    
35 Directive on Third-Country Nationals, supra note 32, art. 11(2).  See also Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 74. 
36 Case C-571/10, Servet Kamberaj v Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano (IPES) and 
Others, 2012 E.C.R. I-233 (holding that so long as housing benefits fell under the provisions granted by the Directive 
on Third-Country Nationals, a provision restricting the benefits to third-country nationals is discriminatory).  
37 Id. ¶¶ 31-32.  
38 Id. ¶ 33.  
39 Id. ¶ 71.  
40 Id. ¶ 93.  
41 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 74, citing Case C-134/95 USSL n 47 di Biella, 1997 E.C.R. I-195, ¶19.  
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apply to situations involving a single Member State.42  The test for whether or not a case involves 
solely an internal situation has been more restrictive as cases have required the foreign element to 
consist of an economic scope.43  
In the Case of Werner, a German national was educated and practiced dentistry in 
Germany, but resided in the Netherlands.44  German law at the time provided for special reliefs, 
such as a splitting tariff, to those who qualified for unlimited taxation, typically residents.45  
However, these advantages were not available to those subject to limited taxation, typically 
nonresidents.46  The German government subjected Mr. Werner to limited taxation because he 
lived outside of the State and thus was considered a nonresident for tax purposes.47  The issue was 
whether EECT Art 52 prohibits Member States from applying a heavier tax burden to its nationals 
who live outside their territory, but earn almost all of their income there.48  The Court of Justice 
determined there was no cross-border element present to invoke the fundamental freedoms and 
therefore Germany was allowed to create a heavier tax burden for nationals who earned income in 
Germany but lived elsewhere.49  
Contrary to the decision in Werner, the Court in Ritter determined that a couple was eligible 
to invoke the fundamental freedoms under ECT Article 39 (former EECT 48), although the couple 
moved their place of residence to another Member State without exercising any economic 
                                                 
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Case C-112/91, Hans Werner v Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1993 E.C.R. I-429, ¶ 5 (arguing that Member States 
are not precluded from imposing heavier tax burdens on their nationals because of the lack of a cross-border element).  
45 Id. ¶ 4.  A splitting tariff allows a spouse who earns more income to attribute a portion of it to the other spouse in 
order to reduce their tax rate and thus pay less income tax.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. ¶ 6.  
48 Id. ¶ 10.  
49 Id. ¶ 17.  
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activity.50  In this case, the husband and wife were nationals of Germany, working as school 
teachers in Germany, but living in France.51   The German government assessed the couple’s 
income tax, but refused to take account of their negative income derived from their use of their 
private home in France.52  Unlike in Werner, the Court here held that the appellants, “who worked 
in a Member State other than that of their actual place of residence,” were covered under the scope 
of Art 48 EC (former EECT Art 48).53  Thus, without an explanation, it would seem as though the 
Court overruled Werner in this case.54  Therefore, it is unclear whether economic activity is 
actually a requirement by the Court or not, but as followed by case law to date it would seem to be 
overruled.  Furthermore, critics such as Martin describe the holding in Ritter, although desirable, 
ultimately inconclusive without more.55  
Similar to the facts of Ritter, the Court recently held its decision in Kieback.  Mr. Kieback 
was a German national, living in Germany where he personally owned his home, but worked in 
the Netherlands. 56   The Netherland tax authorities taxed Mr. Kieback without taking into 
consideration “the ‘negative income’ relating to his dwelling.”57  The only difference between this 
                                                 
50 Case C-152/03, Hans-Jürgen Ritter-Coulais and Monique Ritter-Coulais v Finanzamt Germersheim, 2006 E.C.R. I-
1711, ¶ 41  (holding that provisions denying individuals whom receive income in one Member State to have income 
losses in regards to their private dwelling in another Member State are invalid).  
51 Id. ¶ 3.  
52 Id. ¶ 7.  “‘Negative income’ is income derived from the use of immovable property which is taxable only in the 
State in which that property is situated, namely in France, under the agreement between France and Germany for the 
avoidance of double taxation.” D. Martin, Comments on Ritter-Coulais (Case C-152/03 of 21 February 2006) and 
Ioannidis (Case C-258/04 of 15 September 2005), in 8 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF MIGRATION AND LAW 231 (2006).  
53 Case C-152/03, Hans-Jürgen Ritter-Coulais and Monique Ritter-Coulais v Finanzamt Germersheim, 2006 E.C.R. I-
1711, ¶ 32.  
54Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 74 citing D. Martin, Comments on Ritter-Coulais (Case C-152/03 of 21 February 
2006) and Ioannidis (Case C-258/04 of 15 September 2005), in 8 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF MIGRATION AND LAW 231, 
235 (2006).  
55 D. Martin, Comments on Ritter-Coulais (Case C-152/03 of 21 February 2006) and Ioannidis (Case C-258/04 of 15 
September 2005), in 8 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF MIGRATION AND LAW 231, 235 (2006).  
56 Case C-9/14, Staatssecretaris van Financiën v D. G. Kieback, 2015 EUR-Lex 406 (June 18, 2015), ¶ 9 (arguing that 
a Member State is allowed to deny a tax advantage under the Schumacker principle on the basis that the taxpayer’s 
income did not form the major part of his income for the whole year in question).  
57 Id. ¶ 11. 
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case and Ritter was that Mr. Kieback left the Netherlands to work in the United States during the 
year of question.58 
 Applying the Schumacker principle, the Court determined that “the Member State in which 
a taxpayer has received only part of his taxable income during the whole of the year at issue is 
therefore not bound to grant him the same advantages which it grants to its own residents.”59  The 
Court also made clear that this interpretation was not affected because the taxpayer moved his 
employment from a Member State to a non-member State.60 
It is interesting to point out that in the most recent cases the Court of Justice is more apt to 
determine there is no discriminatory treatment of these migrant workers in the tax context.  
Moreover, in Kieback the Court argues that the taxpayer was not in a comparable situation as to 
residents of the Member State because he did not receive “all or almost all of his family income” 
in that Member State.”61  However, if that were the case then the new State would make the same 
argument and not grant the advantage.  Thus, under the Schumacker principle, neither State would 
then take into account his personal and family obligations.  Therefore, this case seems to be 
contrary to Schumacker, even though the taxpayer did move to a non-member State.  
IV. DISCRIMINATION DEFINED  
It is understood that “discrimination can arise only through the application of different rules 
to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different situations.”62  It is also said 
that “the principle of non-discrimination requires that comparable situations must not be treated 
                                                 
58 Id.  
59 Id. ¶ 34.  
60 Id. ¶ 36.  
61 Id. ¶ 34.  
62 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 75 citing Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. R. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-
225, ¶ 30.   
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differently unless such treatment is objectively justified.”63  In conjunction, a reasonable inference 
is that discrimination exists only when a comparable situation and different treatment are 
intertwined or vice versa.64  
 Both direct discrimination based on nationality (overt discrimination) and different 
treatment under other circumstances that lead to the same result (covert discrimination) are 
prohibited.65  Originally, it was thought that the difference in treatment based on tax residence was 
indirect (covert) discrimination because a majority of the non-residents are nationals of other 
Member States.66 
 Discriminatory behavior amounts to more than just the basis of nationality.67  It also exists 
when discrimination creates obstacles to cross-border activities, which “preclude or deter a 
national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin to exercise his right to freedom of 
movement.”68  For instance, the Bosman case regarding the highly renown European football 
player made clear that “provisions which preclude or deter a national of a Member State from 
leaving his country of origin in order to exercise his right to freedom of movement therefore 
constitute an obstacle to that even if they apply without regard to the nationality of the workers 
concerned.”69 
                                                 
63 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 75 citing Case C-403/03, Schempp v. Finanzamt Munchen V, 2005 E.C.R. I-6421,  ¶ 
28;  Case C-354/95 National Farmers’ Union and Others, 1997 E.C.R. I-4559, ¶ 61.   
64 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 75. 
65 Case C-175/88, Biehl v. Administration des Contributions, 1990 E.C.R. I-1779, ¶ 13;  see also Litwinczuk, supra 
note 30, at 75 citing Case C-152/73, Sotgiu v. Deutsche Post, 1974 E.C.R. I-153, ¶ 11.  
66 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 75 citing Case C-175/88, Biehl v. Administration des Contributions, 1990 E.C.R. I-
1779, ¶ 14. 
67 When making reference to nationality, I mean an individual’s citizenship.  Typically, the references made in this 
analysis refer to citizens of Member States.  However, in some instances, like that of third-country nationals, it refers 
to an individual’s citizenship of a non-member State.  
68 Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 
I-4291, ¶ 96;  see also Case C-10/90 Masigo v Bundesknappschaft, 1991 E.C.R. I-1119, ¶¶ 18-19.  
69 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 75 citing Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association 
ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4291, ¶ 96  (arguing that a sporting association is prohibited from 
mandating that a club of another Member State must pay the former club a transfer fee in order for a footballer to 
change employment).  
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 Similar to Bosman, the Court in Graf determined whether a company’s refusal to pay an 
employee compensation on termination of employment constituted a provision which precluded 
or deterred a national from leaving his Member State in violation of his right to freedom of 
movement.70  Mr. Graf terminated his employment with a company located in Austria in order to 
reside and work in Germany.71  The company refused to give Mr. Graf his two months’ salary 
because under their employment agreement if an employee left “prematurely for no important 
reason” he was not entitled to the compensation. 72   Unlike in Bosman, however, the Court 
determined that this provision was not in violation of Art 45 (former EECT Art 48) since Mr. Graf 
would have been entitled to the compensation had he waited until the contract ended.73  This 
conclusion, though, seems contrary to that of Bosman.  Allowing the company to decide when a 
contract should end is the same as allowing a company to decide that for an employee to leave, the 
new employer must pay a fee.  Such provisions deter employees from leaving and thus restrict 
their freedom of movement.  
 There have been inconsistent cases where a national of a Member State invoked the 
fundamental freedoms against its own state, but the Court spoke about discrimination on a basis 
of nationality.74  The Advocate General Leger, in the Opinion of the Asscher case, gives an 
explanation of this inconsistency:  
the nationals of a Member State may rely on Article 48 or 52 of the Treaty 
concerning freedom of movement when, by virtue of their conduct, they have 
placed themselves in one of the positions envisaged by Community law and are 
                                                 
70 Case C-190/98, Volker Graf v Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH, 2000 E.C.R. I-493  (holding that a provision that 
denies entitlement to compensation on termination of employment to an employee who terminates his contract on his 
own in order to take up employment in another company is valid).  
71 Id. ¶ 5.  
72 Id. ¶¶ 3 and 6.  
73 Id. ¶ 26.  
74 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 76 citing Case C-175/88, Biehl v. Administration des Contributions, 1990 E.C.R. I-
1779; Case C-107/94, Asscher v. Staatsecretaris van Financien, 1996 E.C.R. I-3089, ¶¶ 49-50.  
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with regard to their state of origin, in a situation which may be assimilated to that 
of any person enjoying the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Treaty.75 
 
 On the Other hand, Article 45 of the TFEU prohibits both discriminatory treatment on the 
basis “of nationality in an inbound situation” as well as restrictions created by the home state, 
unless the restrictions are justified and proportionate.76  The Court has articulated that Article 28 
of the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) performs similar functions. 77   Other 
international agreements suggest protection from inbound discriminatory situations, but it is yet to 
be decided whether they apply equally to the protection of outbound situations.78 
 The TFEU “is not concerned with any disparities in treatment, for persons and undertakings 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Community, which may result from divergences existing between 
various Member States, so long as they affect all persons subject to them in accordance with 
objective criteria and without regard to their nationality.”79  The Court further makes clear that in 
regards to tax legislation, the Treaty offers no guarantee that an individual, a citizen of the Union, 
who transfers his or her activities to another Member State will be “neutral as regards taxation” 
but that such a move may be to the individuals’ tax advantage or disadvantage depending on the 
legislation and the circumstances.80  This is largely so because of the tax disparities between 
Member States.  
                                                 
75 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 76 citing Opinion of Advocate General Léger, P. H. Asscher v Staatssecretaris van 
Financiën, Case C-107/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-3089, ¶ 36.  
76 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 76. 
77 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 76 citing Case C-104/06, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of 
Sweden, 2007 E.C.R. I-671  (“[Provisions] which make entitlement to deferral of taxation on capital gains arising 
from the sale of a private residential property… also being in national territory [are precluded]”).  
78 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 76 citing Lukasz Adamczyk, The Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons and 
its Potential Impact on Direct Taxes Systems of EU Member States, 35 INTERTAX 183, 200 (2007).  
79 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 76 citing Case C-403/03, Schempp v. Finanzamt Munchen V, 2005 E.C.R. I-6421,  ¶ 
34;  Case C-354/95, Milk Marque and National Farmers’ Union, 1997 E.C.R. I-4559, ¶ 124.   
80 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 76 citing Case C-403/03, Schempp v. Finanzamt Munchen V, 2005 E.C.R. I-6421,  ¶ 
45  (holding that a provision in which a taxpayer is restricted from deducting his taxable income in that Member State 
for maintenance paid to his former spouse in another Member State is valid).  
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 The Court has not explicitly defined the term disparity, although it has been used numerous 
times in explanations.81  However, according to Wattel, to determine whether disparity exists “one 
should imagine that both states involved were to have exactly the same legal system; if within such 
thought experiment the disadvantage disappears, then it was a disparity effect.”82 
V. THE EUROPEAN TAX REVOLUTION 
The harmonization of taxes is not mentioned in the TFEU.83  However, the Court of Justice 
has established that although “direct taxation does not as such fall within the competence of the 
Community, powers retained by the Member States in that domain must nonetheless be exercised 
consistently with Community Law.”84  Thus, the Court has reviewed numerous cases on the matter, 
which has led to what is known as “the European Tax Revolution” or a “negative integration.”85  
This process has removed national tax law provisions, which the Court found to be incompatible 
with European Union law. 86  
Not only did the Court rule on national tax legislations, it also considered the treaties 
between Member States.  Under the Court’s case law, “in the absence of unifying or harmonizing 
measures adopted in the Community the Member States remain competent to determine the criteria 
for taxation of income and capital with view to eliminating double taxation by means of 
                                                 
81 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 76. 
82 Id.  citing B J M TERRA & P J WATTEL, EUROPEAN TAX LAW 57 (2005). 
83 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 76. 
84 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 76 citing Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 
I-225, ¶ 21.  
85 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 76. 
86 Id.  
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international agreements.”87  The Court has made it clear that although Member States retain the 
power of taxation, they must comply with the Community rules.88   
The Court has decided that Member States are not required to grant a national of another 
Member State “the most favored treatment given to” another “on the basis of a tax treaty” 
following the fundamental freedoms.89   The decision in D. stated that a non-resident from a 
Member State is not in a comparable position to that of a non-resident of another Member State 
that has a bilateral tax treaty with a Member State.90  To be precise, the decision states, “the fact 
that those reciprocal rights and obligations apply only to persons resident in one of the two 
Contracting Member States is an inherent consequence of bilateral double taxation conventions.”91  
Thus, the different treatment of the non-residents from dissimilar Member States not party to the 
bilateral treaty, the Court held, does not constitute discrimination based on nationality.92 
There is, however, an outright criticism of the CJEU’s holding in the D. case.93  Overall, 
van Thiel argues that there is “very little fundamental difference between doing business in another 
Member state through permanent establishment or through the acquisition of real estate.” 94  
However, it seems as though the Court was hesitant to grant the same ruling in both cases because 
                                                 
87 Id. at 77.  See Case C-336/96, Mr and Mrs Robert Gilly v Directeur des services fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R. 
I-2793, ¶¶ 24 and 30;  See also Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v 
Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-6161, ¶ 57.  
88  Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 77 citing Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, Zweigniederlassung 
Deutschland v Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-6161, ¶ 58.   
89 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 77. 
90 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 77 citing Case C-376/03, D. v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/ Particulieren/ 
Ondernemingen buitenland te Heerlen, 2005 E.C.R. I-5821, ¶ 61  (arguing that provisions under a bilateral convention 
for avoidance of double taxation allow residents of the two States personal allowances, but not to others not a party to 
the convention). 
91 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 77 citing Case C-376/03, D. v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/ Particulieren/ 
Ondernemingen buitenland te Heerlen, 2005 E.C.R. I-5821, ¶ 61. 
92 Case C-376/03, D. v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/ Particulieren/ Ondernemingen buitenland te Heerlen, 2005 
E.C.R. I-5821, ¶ 63. 
93 See Servaas van Thiel, A Slip of the European Court in the D case (C-376/03): Denial of the Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment because of Absence of Similarity?, 33 INTERTAX 454, 454 (2005).  
94 Id. at 456.  
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“a most-favored-nation treatment obligation would constitute a danger for the application of tax 
treaties.”95   Nevertheless, the Court already decided in Gilly, that a provision allocating tax 
jurisdiction between Member States is not discriminatory.96   Yet, the Court determined that 
existing law in essence does not prescribe the most-favored nation treatment by D.’s reasoning.97  
Therefore, it is apparent that the current holding in D. undermines the very basic principles of 
established Community law.98  Furthermore, this takes the Court’s decision farther from a bright 
line rule and even farther from harmonizing its tax decisions.  
VI. TAX TREATMENT OF MIGRANT WORKERS 
Luxembourg dealt with the first case involving the tax treatment of workers; this case being 
Biehl.99  The issue revolved around Luxembourg’s tax provisions at that time.100  Specifically, the 
Member State had an overpaid wage tax, which was duly withheld at source from resident 
taxpayers and could not be repaid if transfer of residence occurred in the course of the year.101  
Thus, Mr. Biehl, a Luxembourg resident who moved to Germany, had his refund claim 
dismissed.102   
The Court of Justice began the discussion by recalling that “the rules regarding equality of 
treatment forbid not only overt discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of 
discrimination which, by the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead to the same 
                                                 
95 Id.  
96 Id.  See Case C-336/96, Mr and Mrs Robert Gilly v Directeur des services fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, 1998 E.C.R. I-2793.  
97 Servaas van Thiel, A Slip of the European Court in the D case (C-376/03): Denial of the Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment because of Absence of Similarity?, 33 INTERTAX 454, 456 (2005). 
98 Id. at 457.  
99 Case C-175/88, Biehl v. Administration des Contributions, 1990 E.C.R. I-1779  (holding that provisions that deduct 
sums from salaries of employed individuals of a Member State whom are resident taxpayers for only a part of the 
year, remain property of the Member State are invalid).  
100 Id. ¶ 5.  
101 Id. ¶ 6.  
102 Id. ¶¶ 3 and 5.  
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result.” 103   Applying these criteria, the Court determined that “even though the criterion of 
permanent residence in the national territory […] applies irrespective of the nationality of the 
taxpayer concerned, there is a risk that it will work in particular against taxpayers who are nationals 
of other Member States.” 104   Therefore, the Luxembourg provisions were found to be 
discriminatory and incompatible with the EU law.105 
The lesson that should be taken from this case is the idea that the Court came to a 
conclusion by evaluating and applying the prohibition of covert discrimination in the field of direct 
taxation without any justifications for its qualifications.106  The conclusion implied that there is no 
objective difference between residents and non-residents that would imply a justification of 
unfavorable treatment of the non-residents. 107   Thus, any Member State’s tax provisions 
disfavoring non-residents is likely to get struck down by the Court.108 
VII. THE SCHUMACKER PRINCIPLE 
The Schumacker principle came about because of the 1967 Belgium-Germany tax treaty.109  
Mr. Schumacker was a Belgian national residing in Belgium and working in Germany. 110  
However, according to the treaty, his income was taxable in the state where he was employed but 
in Belgium he would receive an exemption with progression.111  Thus, because of the treaty, Mr. 
Schumacker was unable to take advantage of personal allowances in Belgium since all of his 
                                                 
103 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 77 citing Case C-175/88, Biehl v. Administration des Contributions, 1990 E.C.R. I-
1779, ¶ 13.  See also Case C-152/73, Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost, 1974 E.C.R. I-153, ¶ 11.  
104 Case C-175/88, Biehl v. Administration des Contributions, 1990 E.C.R. I-1779, ¶ 14.  
105 Id. ¶ 19.  
106 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 77. 
107 Id.  
108 Id.  
109 Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Koln-Alstadt v. R. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225, ¶ 16.  
110 Id. ¶ 15.  
111 Id. ¶ 16.  
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earned income came from Germany.112  Conversely, he was denied benefits in Germany because 
he was treated as a non-resident.113  
The Court’s interpretation of the issue began with identifying that national laws denying 
tax benefits to nationals of other member States as non-residents are typically foreigners, and thus 
constitute indirect discrimination.114  However, the Court further distinguishes between residents 
and non-residents thus holding residents “are not, as a rule” in comparable situations, and therefore 
application of different rules does not necessarily mean discrimination.115   
The Court provided two reasons for this distinction.  First, it was stated that typically a 
non-resident earns his or her income only partially in the source state and the rest is earned in the 
residence state.116  Second, “ a taxpayer’s personal ability to pay tax, determined by reference to 
his aggregate income and his personal and family circumstances, is more easy to access in the 
residence state as his personal and financial interests are centered there and, consequently, the 
necessary information is available there.”117  Because of these determinations, the Court held that 
“the fact that a Member State does not grant to a non-resident certain tax benefits which it grants 
to a resident is not, as a rule, discriminatory since those two categories of taxpayer are not in a 
comparable situation” and therefore the EC Treaty is not violated.118 
Nonetheless, the Court did qualify the general idea of non-comparability of a non-resident 
to a resident by introducing a situation “where the non-resident receives no significant income in 
the State of his residence and obtains the major part of his taxable income from an activity 
                                                 
112 Id. ¶ 15.  
113 Id. ¶ 18.  
114 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 78 citing Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Koln-Alstadt v. R. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-
225, ¶ 28.  
115 Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Koln-Alstadt v. R. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225, ¶ 31.  
116 Id. ¶ 32.  
117 Id.  
118 Id. ¶ 34.  
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performed in the State of employment,” thus making it impossible for his State of residence to take 
account of his personal and family circumstances.119  Objectively, there was no difference between 
a resident and non-resident under this situation. 120   Therefore, the Court determined Mr. 
Schumacker was discriminated against because neither his residence state nor the state of 
employment took into account his personal and family circumstances.121 
Thus, Schumacker created the concept of a “virtual tax resident.”122  This means where a 
non-resident is earning all or almost all of his or her income from a source state and whose 
residence state cannot take into account his or her personal and family circumstances into 
account.123  These conditions are today known as the Schumacker test.124  As a result, when a non-
resident meets the requirements of this test, the employment state is under obligation to grant the 
individual a national tax treatment.125  
According to the Advocate General Léger, “the taxpayer’s personal situation is therefore 
taken into account only in his state of residence, were the taxation takes into account all of his 
income in order to avoid duplication of the personal relief and deductions granted to him.”126  
Consequently, this principle comes into play “when a negative conflict of jurisdiction exists 
between the state of employment and the state of residence where neither of those states on the 
basis of the relevant tax treaty takes personal circumstances into account.”127  In conjunction, it 
                                                 
119 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 78 citing Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Koln-Alstadt v. R. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-
225, ¶ 36.  
120 Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Koln-Alstadt v. R. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225,. ¶ 37. 
121 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 78 citing Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Koln-Alstadt v. R. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-
225, ¶ 38.  
122 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 78. 
123 Id. at 78-79 citing Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Koln-Alstadt v. R. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. I-225, ¶¶ 36-37. 
124 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 79. 
125 Id.  
126 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 79 citing Opinion of Advocate General Léger, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. R. 
Schumacker, Case C-279/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-228, ¶ 60.  
127 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 79 citing Opinion of Advocate General Léger, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. R. 
Schumacker, Case C-279/93, [1995] E.C.R. I-228, ¶ 67.   
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becomes evident that the Shumacker principle is an anti-abuse provision in effect preventing 
individuals to claim personal allowances twice.128 
Schumacker is a modern case on the basis that the Court of Justice balanced 
accommodating and integrating EU law as well as direct and tax treaty considerations.129  Despite 
the lack of harmonization measures, this case opened the possibility to confront future direct tax 
matters. 130   The history of its application shows how the Court of Justice has moved from 
determining certain Member State provisions are precluded as discriminatory to individual 
taxpayers to determining that such provisions under similar circumstances are not precluded.  
Thus, moving further away from harmonizing tax measures between Member States.  
VIII. SPOUSAL DISCRIMINATION 
Another important topic relevant to discrimination of workers involves a spouse.  In 
Zurstrassen, a Belgian national both worked and lived in Luxembourg.131  His wife, to whom he 
was not separated from, lived in Belgian and took care of the children; she had no other job that 
earned income.132  According to Luxembourg law, joint assessment for tax purposes was limited 
to couples where both spouses were resident in Luxembourg.133  Thus, Mr. Zurstrassen was denied 
a split tariff because his wife was not a resident of Luxembourg.134 
The Court of Justice determined that the law did not ensure equal treatment.135  The Court 
noted that it is easier for both spouses who are nationals of Luxembourg to fulfill the requirement 
                                                 
128 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 79. 
129 F. Alfredo Garcia Prats, Revisiting “Schumacker”: Source, Residence and Citizenship in the ECJ Case Law on 
Direct Taxation, in ALLOCATING TAXING POWERS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION 1, 3 (I. Richelle et al. eds., 2013). 
130 Id. at 2.  
131 Case C-87/99, Patrick Zurstrassen v Administration des contributions directes, 2000 E.C.R. I-3337, ¶ 8  (arguing 
that a joint tax assessment of spouses cannot be conditional on them both being resident in the Member State). 
132 Id. ¶¶ 8-9.   
133 Id. ¶ 7.   
134 Id. ¶ 10.  
135 Id. ¶ 20.  
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than it is for nationals of other Member States who have moved to Luxembourg “in order to pursue 
an economic activity”, whose members of family more frequently reside outside of 
Luxembourg.136 
Next, in Gschwind, a national of the Netherlands lived together with his wife in the 
Netherlands, but earned all of his income in Germany.137  The sole difference between this case 
and Zurstrassen was that here the wife worked in the Netherlands. 138   Following the 1959 
Netherlands-Germany tax treaty and national law, Mr. Gschwind’s income was solely taxable in 
Germany.139  Germany allowed him to deduct certain business and training expenses and granted 
him a dependent child allowance.140  His wife received remuneration and was given allowances in 
the Netherlands.141  The husband applied for a joint assessment in Germany but was denied.142  
Under German provisions at that time, “a non-resident could benefit from splitting tariff when 
either his income represented 90% of the aggregate income of his household or if the household 
income not taxable in Germany was not higher than DEM 24 000.”143  Mr. Gschwind met neither 
of those requirements.144 
German tax authorities argued that such treatment did not violate EU law on the basis of 
the Schumacker test.145  Applying that principle, “non-residents may benefit from the splitting 
procedure only if their personal and family circumstances could not be taken into account in the 
                                                 
136 Id. ¶ 19.   
137 Case C-391/97, Frans Gschwind v Finanzamt Aachen-Außenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-5451, ¶ 9  (arguing that a 
provision which grants resident married couples favorable tax treatment, and non-resident married couples a less 
favorable tax treatment is valid).  
138 Id. ¶ 10.  
139 Id.  
140 Id. ¶ 7. 
141 Id. ¶ 11.  
142 Case C-391/97, Frans Gschwind v Finanzamt Aachen-Außenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-5451, ¶ 11. 
143 Id. ¶ 6.  
144 Id. ¶ 11.  
145 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 81 citing Case C-391/97, Frans Gschwind v Finanzamt Aachen-Außenstadt, 1999 
E.C.R. I-5451, ¶¶ 15-16.  
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state of residence” and here the couple had enough income to have their tax accessed in Belgium.146  
Conversely, the Belgian government declared, “there is no objective reason to justify refusing to 
apply the splitting procedure to a non-resident couple on the ground that the couple's income from 
foreign sources exceeds a specific ceiling or a given percentage of the couple's total income.”147 
Surprisingly, the Commission was in favor of the taxpayer by indicating that the spouse 
with the higher income “can benefit from the splitting tariff by falling in a lower tax bracket under 
progression rules.”148  Additionally, the Commission pointed out that the current situation was 
objectively comparable “to that of a couple residing in Germany one of whom receives, in another 
Member State, earned income exempt from German tax under a double-taxation treaty but to 
whom the German legislature allows the splitting arrangement to be applied.”149 
In the end, the Court distinguished the case here from that of Schumacker by explaining:  
in the present case, given that nearly 42% of the total income of the Gschwinds is 
received in their State of residence, that State was in a position to take into account 
Mr. Gschwind’s personal and family circumstances according to the rules laid 
down by the legislation of that State, since the tax base is sufficient there to enable 
them to be taken into account.150 
 
Thus, the Court of Justice found no discrimination in violation of the Treaty.151  However, although 
the Court determines Mr. Gschwind’s circumstances were taken into account in Belgium, they 
were in fact not.152  This leads to conclude that it was impossible for him to double dip, which was 
                                                 
146 Id. ¶ 15.  
147 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 81 citing Case C-391/97, Frans Gschwind v Finanzamt Aachen-Außenstadt, 1999 
E.C.R. I-5451, ¶ 17.  
148 Case C-391/97, Frans Gschwind v Finanzamt Aachen-Außenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-5451, ¶ 18.  See Litwinczuk, 
supra note 30, at 81. 
149 Case C-391/97, Frans Gschwind v Finanzamt Aachen-Außenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-5451, ¶ 18. 
150 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 82 citing Case C-391/97, Frans Gschwind v Finanzamt Aachen-Außenstadt, 1999 
E.C.R. I-5451, ¶ 29.  
151 Case C-391/97, Frans Gschwind v Finanzamt Aachen-Außenstadt, 1999 E.C.R. I-5451, ¶ 32.  
152 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 82 citing P J Wattel, European Union: Progressive Taxation of Non-Residents and 
Intra-EC Allocation of Personal Tax Allowances: Why Schumacker, Asscher, Gilly and Gschwind Do Not Suffice, 40 
EUROPEAN TAXATION 210, 218 (2000).  
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the essence behind the Schumacker principle.153  Moreover, just like the Commission pointed out, 
“it would make no sense” for the “spouse with the lower income” to apply for the joint 
assessment.154 
 Notwithstanding, the Court had the opportunity to rectify its decision in Meindl.155  The 
facts of this case regarded an Austrian national residing in Germany who received all of his income 
from Germany.156   The wife was a resident of Austria but did not receive any employment 
income.157  However, she did receive a confinement allowance, a maternity allowance and a family 
allowance in the form of payments amounting DEM 27 000 from the government of Austria.158  
Under Austrian law, the wife’s income was not taxable, but under German law it was.159   
 German law stipulated that “joint assessment is possible only where at least 90% of the 
income of both spouses for the calendar year is subject to German income tax or where the amount 
of income not subject to that tax does not exceed DEM 24 000.”160  Because the couple did not 
qualify under these provisions, German authorities denied the application for a joint assessment.161 
 The Court’s analysis began with pointing out that a German resident with a spouse who 
received non-taxable income, who was also a resident of Germany, would benefit from a joint 
assessment.162  Therefore, the claimant here was subjected to different treatment.163  Additionally, 
the Court held that the present case was comparable to “a resident taxpayer whose spouse is a 
                                                 
153 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 82. 
154 Id.  
155 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 82.  See Case C-329/05, Finanzamt Dinslaken v Gerold Meindl, 2006 E.C.R. I-1107  
(holding that refusing a resident taxpayer joint assessment of income with his spouse who lives in another Member 
State is not valid). 
156 Case C-329/05, Finanzamt Dinslaken v Gerold Meindl, 2006 E.C.R. I-1107, ¶ 9.  
157 Id. ¶¶ 9-10.  
158 Id. ¶¶ 10 and 12.  
159 Id. ¶ 12.  
160 Id. ¶ 6.  
161 Case C-329/05, Finanzamt Dinslaken v Gerold Meindl, 2006 E.C.R. I-1107, ¶ 12.  
162 Id. ¶ 25.  
163 Id.  
Monica Babula –Final Draft 
 24 
resident in another Member State and receives there only income not subject to tax because, in 
both cases, the household’s taxable income is derived from professional activity of only one of the 
spouses and, in both cases, that spouse is the resident taxpayer.”164  “The state of residence of” that 
kind of a “taxpayer is the only State” that can take into account “the taxpayer’s personal and family 
circumstances.”165  Therefore, the denial of the joint assessment in this case was ruled to be 
discrimination prohibited by the Treaty.166 
 The decision by the Court in Meindl is clearly different than that of Gschwind.167  In the 
former case, the denial of the splitting tariff was found to be discriminatory and in violation of the 
Treaty, unlike the holding in the latter case.168  There seemed to be no substantial differences 
between the two cases.169  It is irrelevant to the analysis the fact that Mr. Meindl was a resident of 
the state of employment since in both cases the husbands did not receive any other income or 
allowances from any other state.170  Therefore, it is inferred that the Court overruled the holding 
in Gschwind with Meindl.171 
 Following this is the Schempp case.  Here, a German resident was paying maintenance fees 
to his former spouse, a resident of Austria.172  German authorities denied a deduction for the 
payments arguing that the taxpayer did not produce a certificate from Austrian authorities 
                                                 
164 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 82 citing Case C-329/05, Finanzamt Dinslaken v Gerold Meindl, 2006 E.C.R. I-
1107, ¶ 26.  
165 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 83 citing Case C-329/05, Finanzamt Dinslaken v Gerold Meindl, 2006 E.C.R. I-
1107, ¶ 29.  
166 Case C-329/05, Finanzamt Dinslaken v Gerold Meindl, 2006 E.C.R. I-1107, ¶ 32.  
167 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 83. 
168 Id.  
169 Id.  
170 Id.  
171 Id.  
172 Case C-403/03, Schempp v Finanzamt München V, 2005 E.C.R. I-6421, ¶ 7.   
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confirming that his former spouse was taxed on those payments.173  However, under Austrian law, 
such payments were not taxable.174   
The Court held that “the payment of maintenance to a recipient resident in Germany cannot 
be compared to the payment of maintenance to a recipient resident in Austria as the recipient is 
subject in each of those two cases, as regards taxation of the maintenance payments, to a different 
tax system.”175  The Court therefore found Mr. Schempp was not victimized by a discriminatory 
threat prohibited by the Treaty, but rather of a disparity between two tax systems, which is outside 
the scope of the fundamental freedoms.176  This case was distinctly more so a tax disparity because 
the evidence provided made clear that one Member State taxed such maintenance fees while the 
other chose not to do so. 
In 2011, the CJEU came to its Schulz decision.177  Mr. Schulz was a German national 
working in Germany as an attorney.178  His spouse, Ms. Schulz-Delzers, was a French national 
working in Germany as a teacher.179  Ms. Schulz-Delzers was privy to two allowances, which were 
exempt in France.180  However, the German authorities took into account the two allowances in 
the progressive application of tax, thus raising the spouses’ income tax by EUR 654. 181  
Accordingly, the Court, applying the Schumacker principle as well as its prior holding in Schempp, 
determined that “the Treaty offers no guarantee to a citizen of the Union that transferring his 
                                                 
173 Id. ¶ 8.  
174 Id. ¶ 9.  
175 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 83 citing Case C-403/03, Schempp v Finanzamt München V, 2005 E.C.R. I-6421,  ¶ 
35.  
176 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 83 citing Case C-403/03, Schempp v Finanzamt München V, 2005 E.C.R. I-6421,  ¶ 
36.  
177 Case C-240/10, Cathy Schulz-Delzers and Pascal Schulz v Finanzamt Stuttgart III, 2011 E.C.R. I-8531  (arguing 
that a provision granting allowances to civil servants of a Member State working in another Member State to 
compensate for loss of purchasing power, but does not take into account the tax rate applicable in the first Member 
State to other income of the taxpayer or his spouse is valid).  
178 Id. ¶ 18.  
179 Id. ¶ 19.  
180 Id. ¶ 21.  
181 Id. ¶ 22.  
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activities to a Member State other than that in which he previously resided will be neutral as 
regards taxation.”182  Thus, the provision was not discriminatory.183 
 In Schulz, the Court determines there is no discriminatory action taken against the couple 
by the German government because tax disparities between Member States are allowed. 184  
Therefore, although tax legislation may be beneficial in France, that is not the case in Germany.185  
However, it was the couple’s discretion to move to Germany and to be jointly assessed there, and 
because of allowable tax disparities “such a transfer may be to the citizen’s advantage or not.”186  
Over time, the Court of Justice has applied a stricter interpretation of the Schumaker principle and 
thus makes it harder for migrant workers to prove discriminatory provisions made by Member 
States.  Conversely, the Court makes it easier for Member States to invoke such provisions.  
IX. TAXATION OF ALLOWANCES 
The next issue of topic is taxation of allowances.  In the case of Wallentin, a German 
student worked as an intern for the Swedish Church over the summer months and earned SEK 
8724 as remuneration.187  German authorities at the time considered such an income as non-
taxable.188  In Sweden, the law considered the full basic allowance of SEK 8600 allowable only to 
residents that were taxed progressively.189  However, a person residing in Sweden for less than six 
months, also regarded as a non-resident, would receive only a proportionate part of the basic 
allowance and would be taxed at a flat rate of 25%.190  Thus, Swedish authorities denied Mr. 
                                                 
182 Case C-240/10, Cathy Schulz-Delzers and Pascal Schulz v Finanzamt Stuttgart III, 2011 E.C.R. I-8531, ¶ 42.  
183 Id. ¶ 43.  
184 Id. ¶ 42.  
185 Id.  
186 Id.  
187 Case C-169/03, Florian W. Wallentin v Riksskatteverket, 2004 E.C.R. I-6443, ¶¶ 3-4  (holding that a provision 
denying allowance calculation of tax to nonresidents of a Member State who receive income from that state is invalid).  
188 Id. ¶ 3.  
189 Id. ¶ 7.  
190 Id. ¶ 5.  
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Wallentin the full basic allowance because he was a resident of Germany and spent less than six 
months in Sweden.191 
The Court determined that Mr. Wallentin passed the Schumacker test. 192   Under the 
analysis of the test, he did not receive any taxable income in Germany, his residence state, and 
therefore Germany was not able to take into account his personal and family circumstances.193  
Thus, the Court found the denial of the basic allowance constituted discrimination prohibited by 
the Treaty.194 
The Court distinguished Wallentin in the case of D..  D. involved a German national who 
owned 10% of his property in the Netherlands.195  Under the law in the Netherlands, a resident 
was entitled to a basic allowance and a non-resident could only enjoy the same right if 90% or 
more of the property was located in the Netherlands.196   
The taxpayer argued that because Germany did not impose a wealth tax, his sole taxable 
base was in the Netherlands, and applying the findings of Wallentin, the source state was required 
to grant him a basic allowance.197  Even the Advocate General Ruiz-Jarobo Colomer supported 
these contentions.198  However, the Court held that because the taxpayer “holds the major part of 
his wealth in the State where he is resident, the Member State in which he holds only a proportion 
of his wealth is not required to grant him the benefits which it grants to its own residents.”199   
                                                 
191 Id.  
192 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 84 citing Case C-169/03, Florian W. Wallentin v Riksskatteverket, 2004 E.C.R. I-
6443, ¶¶ 17 -18.  
193 Case C-169/03, Florian W. Wallentin v Riksskatteverket, 2004 E.C.R. I-6443, ¶¶ 17 -18.  
194 Id. ¶ 24.  
195 Case C-376/03, D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, 2005 E.C.R. I-5821, ¶ 15.   
196 Id. ¶¶ 7 and 9.  
197 Id. ¶ 16.  
198  Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 84 citing Opinion of Advocate General Colomer, D. v. Inspecteur van de 
Belastingdienst, Case C-376/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-5821, ¶¶ 63-65.  
199 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 84 citing Case C-376/03, D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, 2005 E.C.R. I-
5821 ¶ 41.  
Monica Babula –Final Draft 
 28 
The Court tried to distinguish Wallentin from the case at hand by showing that the former 
“received only payments that did not of their nature constitute taxable income under German 
legislation.”200  Thus, the Court distinguishes heavily between discrimination based on nationality 
and fair disparities amongst tax legislations of different Member States.  
X. CONCLUSION 
Therefore, it is appropriate to consider first, whether an individual qualifies as a worker 
under the case law interpretation of the word.  This is fairly easy and typically most individuals 
will fall under this category.  Next, the context of the issue must fall within the scope of the 
fundamental freedoms, meaning that the issue must not be a solely internal one within a single 
Member State.  This is yet another rather easy factor to determine.  However, it is much more 
difficult to determine whether the issue involves actual discriminatory treatment by a Member 
State or not.   
It must be first determined whether there is an existing treaty amongst Member States that 
is at play.  If there is, the Court is likely to hold that nationals of different Member States do not 
have the same standing and therefore there is no discrimination in violation of European Union 
law.  Nevertheless, if there is no treaty relevant to the issue, then the Schumacker principle comes 
in, at least in cases of tax legislation and alleged discrimination based on nationality.  If an 
individual can prove that neither the residence state nor the employment state take into account the 
individuals personal and family circumstances, it is very likely that the Court will find 
discrimination.  Nonetheless, the Court of Justice has not always been consistent with its holdings, 
and thus although there seems to be some foundation to determining discriminatory treatment of 
                                                 
200 Litwinczuk, supra note 30, at 84 citing Case C-376/03, D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst, 2005 E.C.R. I-
5821 ¶ 42.  
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migrant workers in regards to tax legislations, there is no bright line rule to all situations since they 
are all very fact sensitive.  
Moreover, it seems as though the Court in recent decisions has been more in favor of 
Member States.  This means that the CJEU is less likely to find a tax provision to be discriminatory 
against a migrant worker than it first was when it came out with the Schumacker principle.   Such 
considerations by the Court seem to be contrary both to past EU case law and Art 45 of the TFEU.   
Thus, instead of harmonizing tax measures it looks as though the opposite takes place.  
  
